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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Bear River attempts to convince this Court that its "heads I win, tails you lose"
tactics are standard practice. Its idea is that it can hire an insurance doctor to invent
conclusions founded upon specious legal reasoning and thereby escape any and all duties
that it had theretofore owed to its insureds. By combining an insurance doctor's legal
assertions with malicious defensive maneuvering, Bear River believes it can be guaranteed
that its misconduct will go unpunished beyond "the amount of attorney fees incurred in
connection with the preparation of the complaint." Plaintiff disagrees that such a
procedure is authorized by the no-fault statute.
ARGUMENT
I.

PIP COVERAGE IS A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WHICH IS
INTENDED TO PROVIDE INDEMNITY FOR INJURED
MOTORISTS "IMMEDIATELY" FOR ALL "INCURRED"
EXPENSES "WITHOUT HAVING TO BRING A LAWSUIT."

Bear River was required to pay PIP benefits to Mr. Prince within 30 days. It
refused. Bear River had no legally justifiable basis for its refusal; therefore, the failure to
pay the sums owed when due amounted to "breach of contract."
Bear River, in effect, argues that its performance was excused because some of the
medical treatments received by Mr. Prince were, in the opinion of a stranger1 to the
contract, "not medically necessary." A breach occurs when a party's nonperformance is

1

"The parties to a contract may agree that a third person shall determine a given
fact and that his determination shall be conclusive . . . [h]owever, the right to have the
approval of a third person as the test of performance must rest on a provision in the
contract to that effect." 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 496(1).
1

not justified by any term contained in the contract. It necessarily follows that there is no
breach if the nonperforming party proves2 that the nonperformance was permitted by a
specific contractual term.3
Bear River claims that a solecism it calls "reasonable and necessary" permitted4 its
nonperformance.5 Bear River disregards syntax, terms of art, and all rules of statutory
construction and, instead, underlines two words: "reasonable[6] value of all expenses for
necessary. . . ." "Accordingly," it exclaims, its nonperformance was excused. Opposition

2

The burden of proving that admitted nonperformance was permitted under a
particular contractual clause is always on the party alleging such an excuse of
nonperformance. Judge Thome's conclusion to the contrary was absurd.
3

In insurance law, a clause justifying nonperformance is generically called an
"exclusion."
4

Because Bear River's entire defense is predicated on the assertion that the
solecism "reasonable and necessary" justifies its nonperformance, its assertion that the
proper interpretation of its alleged justification does not address Plaintiffs claim for
breach of contract is palpably without merit.
5

When an insured requests coverage, he receives, instead of insurance against loss
incurred, "The Question," the inevitable inquiry laced with accusation: Are your doctor's
diagnoses "reasonable and necessary"?
6

Bear River continues to refuse to recognize the word "reasonable" as a defined
term which must be interpreted as set forth in the no-fault statute. See, e.g.. Opposition
Brief at pp. 7-15. The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this refusal is Bear
River hopes that this Court, like the district court, will fail to read and comprehend the
actual language of the no-fault statute. See, e.g.. Elder v. Clawson. 384 P.2d 802 (Utah
1963) ("It is clear beyond all doubt that this information was withheld for the purpose of
inducing the sale and had that effect. * * * So we conclude that there was a suppression
of the truth, which the party with superior knowledge had a duty to disclose, which
amounted to fraud."). Bear River also asserts that its bad faith was "clearly" first-party
and ignores its contract's promise of a defense against lawsuits from medical providers
because of Bear River's bald conclusions of unnecessariness. Opposition Brief at p. 22.
2

Brief at pp. 7-9.
Bear River, and other overreaching insurance companies, are steadfastly attempting
to transpose the problem of "how far did the legislature intend to extend the protection of
the no-fault statute (and, by necessary implication, how widely did the legislature intend to
employ the risk-spreading device of insurance)" into a fake question about whether a
treating doctor made the "right" diagnosis sufficient to justify the "who-should-pay"
conclusion that the PIP carrier is obligated to provide PIP benefits. This Court may not
delegate its function of interpreting the legislature's expression of public policy to Bear
River, its insurance doctor, or a jury.7
Whether a PIP carrier bottoms its refusal to pay PIP benefits on "reasonable and

7

Bear River continues to insist that "reasonable and necessary" does not relate to
its breach of the contract. Bear River misunderstands basic contract law. Before any
determination concerning the sufficiency of the evidence can be made, a preliminary
issue regarding the requirements imposed by the contract and the appropriate burden of
proof must be resolved. For example, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 115, 103 L. Ed. 2d 80, 109 S. Ct 948 (1989), the Supreme Court held that "a denial
of benefits challenged under §§1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard
unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." And the purchase
of a notorious insurance doctor's opinion such as Marble's must be viewed with
suspicion. Id. at 115 ("Of course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or
fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a
'factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.'") (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Trusts §§ 187 cmt. d (1959)). The Utah no-fault statute does not give any
discretion to Bear River or any of its insurance doctors; rather it requires "immediate"
payment for "all expenses . . . incurred." Therefore, the only relevant issue is whether
Bear River exceeded its authority under the contract when it refused to pay Mr. Prince's
PIP benefits within 30 days based upon an exclusion or "grant of discretion" which it
claimed existed, but which does not actually exist. See also Woodburn v. Industrial
Comm.. 181 P.2d 209, 212 (Utah 1947).
3

necessary," "caused by," "pre-existing condition," "medically necessary," or any other
vague (but incessantly intoned as if to accomplish through repetition that which cannot be
achieved through logical reasoning) terms, it is essentially attempting to impose
fault-based "who-should-pay"8 principles of tort law and proximate causation9 on the
statutory system popularly known as "no-fault." Proximate causation is part of the less
efficient process the legislature referred to when it adopted the no-fault statute as a
solution. Tort law cannot be the solution to the no-fault statute because the no-fault statute
was the solution to tort law.
The no-fault statute was adopted precisely to protect injured motorists from the
traditional tort law defenses10 which inevitably caused delay, physical suffering, and
economic distress. The no-fault statute was intended to provide prompt and efficient
reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses incurred by injured motorists. It determined that
the new system would provide prompt access to medical care that was (1) paid for by the

8

"Care or negligence in attempting to perform a contract is immaterial, the only
question being whether there has been performance." 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 494(1).
9

"There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor, despite
the manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject, is there yet any
general agreement as to the best approach." W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts
§ 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the problems associated with defining and applying
proximate causation).
10

Bear River's fraud (or, arguably, its ignorant and unflinching allegiance to tort
law for the past 28 years) is a result of the fact that the no-fault statute is typically only
addressed by claims adjusters and personal injury attorneys (both plaintiff and defense)
who are only familiar with tort-based negligence principles.
4

injured motorists themselves through insurance premiums;11 (2) provided without
questioning "who-should-pay" because that question is settled by the purchase of the
insurance policy; and (3) paid for immediately after proof of loss.
A contract for PIP coverage is a contract. Bear River may not impose tort concepts
on the parties' contract.12 Bear River's tort-based arguments contemplate "proximate
causation" which turns on a somewhat mystical "who-should-pay" question.
Had the legislature's purpose been the imposition of jury trials to determine the
scope of coverage based on proximate causation concepts (imposing an enormous burden
on victims of automobile-related accidents and a vast supervisory responsibility on the
courts), one may assume it would have made its intention clearer and would at least have
imposed some standards.13 It is hardly a feasible judicial function to decide whether a
11

This is perhaps the primary public policy choice made by the legislature: To
spread the risk of automobile accident costs to all motorists through a compulsory
insurance mechanism with supposedly clear and efficient mechanisms for reimbursement.
12

"Tort law embodies statements of public policy . . . . Contracts, by contrast,
involve voluntary private agreements that our society endows with the force of law."
Retherford v. AT&T Communications. 844 P.2d 949 at n. 11 (Utah 1992). A PIP
endorsement is what is sometimes called a "statutory contract" because the terms are
made compulsory by the legislature's public policy choices, but the parties' agreement to
contract with each other is still voluntary. Because of the compulsory nature of modern
automobile insurance statutes, the contract between the insured and the insurer "ceases to
be a private contract between the parties and a supervening public interest then attaches
and restricts the rights of the parties in accordance with statutory provisions." Sentry
Indem. Co. v. Sharif. 282 S.E.2d 907, 908 (Ga. 1981); accord Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call
712 P.2d 231, 233-36 (Utah 1985).
13

"[I]t is useful to review the distinction between the insured's need to prove that
a covered loss has occurred in order to be entitled to recover, and the insured's need to
comply with the specific limits which the insurer may have placed on the proof of loss
submitted to it. A basic caveat of insurance law is that the insurance contract, and any
5

doctor should provide one treatment rather than another treatment when many doctors
would agree that both might be equally valid alternatives14 and where the costs of that
determination will almost certainly exceed the cost of the treatment itself, thereby creating
a Hobson's choice (i.e., accept the loss imposed by the PIP carrier or sue the PIP carrier
and accept a different — larger — loss) for the people the legislature intended to protect.
II.

THE "RECOGNIZED" SOLECISM "REASONABLE AND
NECESSARY" DOES NOT EXIST IN THE NO-FAULT
STATUTE.

Bear River asserts that "reasonable and necessary" is a "recognized standard."
Plaintiff has repeatedly asked: What, then, are the elements of this so-called "standard"?
Bear River refuses to say. Instead, Bear River presents the bald conclusion of its doctor
who asserts that he did not "think"15 that care prescribed by Mr. Prince's treating

governing statutes read into it establish the boundaries of the policy coverage by
specifying what 'risk' the insurer is assuming in exchange for the insured's premium." G.
Couch, Couch on Insurance 3d § 193.19 at pp. 193-29 - 193-30 (emphasis added).
14

Unlike insurance doctors, most real doctors are rarely 100% certain that their
diagnoses are completely correct. This should not preclude the patient's right to PIP
benefits; rather it appears to be but the caution against the positiveness of the foolhardy
that any prudent doctor would use.
15

See A.M.L. v. Department of Health. 863 P.2d 44 (Utah App. 1993) ("Further,
we note that several courts require state Medicaid agencies to recognize a presumption 'in
favor of the medical judgment of the attending physician in determining the medical
necessity of treatment.' Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1989); see also
Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980) ('The decision of whether or not
certain treatment or a particular type of surgery is 'medically necessary' rests with the
individual recipient's physician and not with clerical personnel or government officials.').
The basis for this presumption is found in part in the legislative history of the Medicaid
statute: 'The Committee's bill provides that the physician is to be the key figure in
determining utilization of health services—and provides that it is the physician who is to
6

physicians and actually received by him was "medically necessary." See, e.g.. Opposition
Brief at p. 14. Where in the contract or the statute16 does the injured motorist receive
notice17 that some insurance doctor's pas/ hoc "thoughts"18 will govern an insured person's

decide upon an admission to a hospital, or to tests, drugs and treatments, in determining
the length of stay.' S. Rep. No. 404, 89 Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1943, 1986. In addition, cthe Medicaid statute and regulatory
scheme create a presumption in favor of the medical judgment of the tending physician in
determining the medical necessity of treatment.' Weaver, 885 F.2d at 200; see also Frey
v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that in social security disability
proceeding, reports of treating or consulting physicians are entitled to greater weight than
those of physicians hired by agency resisting claim); Worthington v. Idaho Dep 't of
Health and Welfare, No. 69458, slip op. at 5 (2d Dist. Idaho Feb. 20, 1992) (holding that
'the legislative history, Medicaid case law, and the mechanics of the Medicaid program
itself require that an attending physician's opinion as to what constitutes medical
necessity in a given case be given deference).").
16

The Court must examine the no-fault statute in its entirety and in accordance
with its purpose, giving effect to all of its parts. See Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Prods. Co.,
614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980). The legislature's purpose was to create "a more efficient
process for liquidating personal injury claims and [to provide] an incentive for persons
driving Utah's highways to obtain motor vehicle insurance." Warren v. Melville, 937
P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1997).
17

"In cases where the notice is ambiguous or misleading, courts have found a
denial of due process. In Watson v. Washington Preferred Life Insurance Co,, 81 Wash.
2d 403, 502 P.2d 1016 (1972) (en banc), notice of a shareholders' meeting '[t]o consider
and vote upon a plan and agreement of merger... [and to] transact... other business' was
held constitutionally inadequate and violative of due process because it failed to inform
shareholders that those not receiving the mailed notice would be treated as 'missing
shareholders' and that, should they fail to appear at the shareholders' meeting, the court
would appoint, ex parte, a representative to vote their shares. 502 P.2d at 1020." Nelson
v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983).
18

Even if the "thoughts" of an insurance doctor were construed as an implied term
of the statute, it could not contradict the express promise that medical expenses "shall" be
reimbursed monthly as expenses are "incurred." See, e.g.. Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd.,
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) ("an implied-in-fact promise cannot, of course, contradict a
written contract term.").
7

right to receive PIP benefits?
Bear River simply assumes that Marble's "thoughts" of "medical necessity" were
exactly the same as the legislature's use of the word "necessary," then hurdles over all
other steps or elements which might underlie a true "standard" and proclaims: "Based on
this fact,[19] Bear River discontinued payment of PIP benefits after the 12-week cutoff
period." Id.
The alleged right implicitly20 vested in the author of an adhesion contract to hire a
biased third-party to determine the limits of said party's21 obligations only exists in an
illusory contract.22 "[C]ourts endeavor to construe contracts so as not to grant one of the
19

Bear River refers to the absurd legal opinion of Marble as a "fact" which it
refused to analyze or compare to the medical opinions of the treating doctors. Plaintiff
obtained the medical opinion of his treating physician and he obtained his own IME in
order to attempt to overcome the insurance doctor's assertions. Bear River refused to
consider any opinion other than its insurance doctor's. For this reason, Plaintiff argued
that Bear River was attempting to impose a burden of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt"
because Bear River seemed to assert that its doctor's opinion provided no room for any
reasonable doubt or debate about its contractual obligations. This argument was lost on
Bear River and the trial court.
20

A written contract exists for the purpose of reducing to "writing the conditions
upon which the minds of the parties have met and to fix their rights and duties in
respect thereto." Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958) (citation
omitted). One party to the contract cannot claim for itself the right to interpret the written
contractual terms in the light most favorable to its own financial well-being and in
contravention of the express purposes of the contract. IdL
21

Again, the question presented is not just the parties' rights and obligations;
rather the question relates to public policy choices made by the legislature.
22

Illusory contracts are illegal contracts which are not enforceable. Therefore,
even if Bear River's contract said what Bear River asserts, it would not be enforceable
because (1) its non-compliance with the no-fault statute would render it void and (2)
because it would be an illegal contract.
8

parties an absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a contract." Resource Mgmt. Co. v.
Weston Ranch & Livestock Co.. 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985). The same policy
applies where, as here, the author of the adhesion contract attempts to limit the scope23 of
its contractual liability through an unwritten grant of discretion.
Bear River's reliance upon its insurance doctor's bald assertions to the exclusion of
all competent medical testimony provided by the treating physicians is certainly more
efficient — from the standpoint of Bear River. However, the legislature's interest in
efficiency undoubtedly ran to the prompt24 reimbursement of the public's out-of-pocket
expenses because Subsection 309(5)(a) mandates that payment of PIP benefits "shall be
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred." The promise of payments which are
to be made within 30 days and measured by the expenses "incurred" promotes efficiency
(rather than litigation which might arise from an implied duty to prove25 "necessity"26) and

23

Once the contingent event of "expenses incurred" insured against has occurred
during the period covered, the liability of the carrier becomes contractual rather than
potential only, and the sole issue remaining is the extent of its obligation.
24

See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exclu 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) ("An insured who
has suffered a loss and is pressed financially is at a marked disadvantage when bargaining
with an insurer over payment for that loss. Failure to accept a proffered settlement, although
less than fair, can lead to catastrophic consequences for an insured who, as a direct
consequence of the loss, may be peculiarly vulnerable, both economically and emotionally.
The temptation for an insurer to delay settlement while pressures build on the insured is
great, especially if the insurer's exposure cannot exceed the policy limits.").
25

Any duty to prove "necessity" would have to be some sort of contingent
condition precedent which would be triggered by the insurer's purchase of a subjective
contrary opinion from some third-party stranger to the contract. This would be a novel
clause that is not apparent from the plain language of the no-fault statute. A contracting
party's insistence, "wilfully or by mistake," on preconditions to performance not
stated in the contract, constitutes a breach by anticipatory repudiation. See 4 Arthur
9

encourages motorists to obtain insurance to protect themselves and their families against
injury, resultant medical bills, and wage loss.
The no-fault statute did not encourage motorists to obtain PIP coverage by
promising them the right to pay an insurance company in exchange for the right to suffer a
second injury at the hands of said insurance company and/or his or her own medical
providers. Moreover, the increased litigation based on Bear River's split-cause-of-action
argument is hardly "more efficient" than a single lawsuit against the tortfeasor.
A coverage clause in a liability policy promises payment of "all sums for legal
liability." The coverage clause in the no-fault statute states that an insurer will pay "all
expenses for necessary medical [treatment]." The phrase "legal liability" invokes
centuries of common law principles and established procedures for establishing "legal
liability." The phrase "necessary medical [treatment]" means something different to

L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 973, at 910 (1951) ("Such a repudiation is conditional in
character, it is true; but the condition is a performance to which the repudiator has no
right."); see also Martell Bros., Inc. v. Donburv, Inc.. 577 A.2d 334, 337 n.l (Me. 1990)
(a "distinct and unequivocal" repudiation entitles the injured party to treat the contract as
"entirely rescinded," and its obligations under the contract as discharged); REA Express
v. Interwav Corp.. 538 F.2d 953, 955 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying New York law).
26

Judge Thorne ruled that "necessary" means "something more than nonfraudulent." This "ruling" is "something less" than helpful. Even if a jury trial were the
proper procedural remedy available to Mr. Prince as an appraisal mechanism, he could
not have pursued his right because the trial court refused to make a cogent ruling. A trial
court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case. State v.
Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). A party also has the right to have his or her theory
of the case presented to the jury in a clear and comprehensible manner. State v. Smith,
706 P.2d 1052, 1058 (Utah 1985).
10

everybody.27 It certainly does not mean that the legislature invoked28 the proximate cause
and tort principles29 underlying Bear River's assertions.
The "necessary" medical treatment language is contained in the same portion of the
coverage clause as is occupied by "legal liability." Bear River's arguments could be
interpreted as asserting that a jury verdict settles the "necessary" issue the same way that a
jury verdict settles "legal liability" issues because both phrases follow the word "for."
Because there is no historical30 or legal insight gained from the legislature's choice
of words in Section 307, the Court must interpret the language in a way that will render it

27

Bear River makes no attempt to demonstrate that "necessary" is not ambiguous.
Instead, it ignores the ambiguity analysis and resorts to reciting conclusions of other
states' courts. All states' no-fault laws are different. For example, Colorado has a
$50,000.00 coverage limit for medical expenses with treble damages as part of its
remedy, and Florida has a clause that explicitly permits non-payment of medical
expenses, but only after the insurer obtains a competent report stating that treating
physician's treatment was improper. See § 627.736(7), Fla. Stat. (1995).
28

"[T]he stated goals of the Act [are] to promote quick, efficient payment of
benefits on a no-fault basis for personal injury claims. In addition, the Act contemplates
payment of relatively small amounts in medical expenses and preservation of the right to
sue in tort for more serious accidents." Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d
1119, 1122 (Utah App. 1988) (emphasis added) (explaining that administrative actions,
which are similar to Bear River's implicit claims of discretion, should be invalidated
when they do not serve the stated legislative goals because it is the legislature's
prerogative to declare any change in public policy).
29

When the legislature meant "legal liability" it used phrases such as "caused by"
and "legally liable" in the tort-threshold clause and intercompany arbitration clause,
respectively.
30

As set forth in Plaintiffs opening Brief, it is historically significant that
"medical management" did not exist in 1974. See Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. EIMCO
Corp., 207 P.2d 794 (Utah 1949) (explaining that the "intention of the parties must be
determined at the time of the transaction and not at a time subsequent thereto.").
11

constitutional and which will advance the legislative intent that PIP benefits be received
by injured insureds31 monthly so that said injured motorists can continue to meet basic
living expenses. No procedure was set forth by the legislature to determine which
expenses were "necessary." All caselaw32 from this Court indicates that "necessary" is not
located at the center of the no-fault flat-earth.33 Instead, this Court has consistently
explained that the primary goal of the legislature was to guarantee reimbursement of "all
expenses" "quickly," "promptly," "efficiently," and "without litigation."
Bear River claims that the insurance doctor's opinion should settle the issue
because its contract contains a clause34 requiring a so-called "IME." This would be a
31

One way of viewing the no-fault statute is to recognize it as the type of contract
that provides that the decision of one of the parties shall be final. That party's "decision
must be regarded as final in the absence of fraud or such gross mistake as would
necessarily imply bad faith." 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 494(1). Plaintiff argues that
granting discretion to the injured person with respect to his own health and physical
well-being (including the right to rely on the physician of the injured person's choice) is
the appropriate public policy. Bear River insists that it should have the right to rely on its
insurance doctor's opinion regarding the proper treatment decisions for the injured person
or else there will be "a double standard which is unjust." Opposition Brief at p. 13.
Granting the physician-patient privilege to the physician and the patient with respect to
the patient's health, but not granting the same right to the patient's or the physician's
sworn enemies, regarding the patient's health, is hardly "unjust."
32

This Court's decision in Versluis that PIP benefits are supposed to be paid
"immediately" and "without litigation" is diligently ignored by Bear River.
33

Bear River complains that, in its opinion, Plaintiff "has attempted to create new
law" which, at worst, is perfectly acceptable. Nevertheless, Bear River asks for attorney
fees for the "meritless appeal" and emotes pride for its failed attempt at intimidation in
the form of a frivolous Rule 11 motion.
34

See Mowers v. The Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.. 27 F. Supp. 2d 135, 139
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The IME provision in the insurance contract in this case is a
constructive condition. Similar to notice and proof of loss provisions, the IME provision
12

quick and highly efficient method of denying claims, but it is not a good way for the
insureds to receive prompt payment of minimal economic losses. The plain language of
the statute compels payment within 30 days of the PIP carrier's receipt of "reasonable
proof." "Reasonable proof sounds like another litigation-inviting mechanism, but the
legislature added the clarifying prepositional phrase describing the quantum of proof: "of
the fact and amount of expenses incurred."35 The use of the foregoing phrase precludes
Bear River's assertion that its payment is conditioned on what its doctor "thinks" is
"necessary"36 because it is specifically required to pay the reasonable value of expenses

does not expressly condition payment of benefits on submission to an IME, but
merely represents a promise by the plaintiff to submit to IMEs as often as reasonably
required while the claim is pending. Therefore, only substantial compliance with the
condition is necessary. See Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FMIns. Co., 970 F. Supp. 306,
329 (S.D.N. Y. 1997) (holding that notice and proof requirements in insurance contract are
liberally construed and merely require substantial, not strict, compliance).").
35

A claimant should be entitled to PIP benefits even if he or she also recovered
collateral medical or hospital benefits. See Dutta v. State Farm Ins. Co., 363 Md. 540, 769
A.2d 948, 2001 WL 350239 (Md. 2001).
36

Most of the time, PIP carriers equate "necessary" with "excessive" despite the
legislature's use of "excessive" in Subsection 307(2)(d). Another example of "necessary"
as loophole-for-non-payment can be a PIP carrier's assertion that medical procedures do
not meet the standard set forth in the relevant state's version of Rimmasch and Utah R.
Evid. 702. The Pennsylvania Superior Court declined to impose such a stringent standard
to show what was a "necessary" medical treatment because medical technology advances
more rapidly than the law and the legislature could have (but had not) imposed the
well-known evidentiary standard if that is what it had meant. See Tagliati v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 720 A.2d 1051 (Penn. 1998) (also noting that, in the context of the Act's
legislative history and its authorization of reimbursement for treatment consistent with a
"recognized religious method of healing," the standard of general acceptance by a
majority of the medical community would be overly restrictive and generally
incompatible with the primary objectives of the Act).
13

"incurred."
III.

"NECESSARY" IS A COLLATERAL REPRESENTATION,
CONDITION OR WARRANTY.

As explained in Plaintiffs opening Brief, the word necessary does not exist to
reduce the amount of risk transferred by the insurance policy. Instead, it is a promise37
made by the insured. This conclusion promotes legislative intent and also results in
harmony between distinct, but related, portions of the Utah Code. See UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-21-105 (entitled: "Representations, warranties, and conditions.").
If the word necessary is viewed as a "promissory warranty," the defenses available
to the PIP carrier would not even vaguely resemble current practices38 of most insurance
companies. The proper practice, if the word is viewed as a promissory warranty,39 would

37

See, e ^ , Culp Construction Co. v. Buildmart Mall 795 P.2d 650 (Utah 1990)
(stating that the the "better-reasoned approach" views preliminary title reports and title
insurance commitments as "'no more than a statement of the terms and conditions upon
which the insurer is willing to issue its title policy....'").
38

The current practice of miscreant insurers is simple: (1) purchase an opinion
from Marble or a half-dozen others of his ilk, and (2) the predetermined opinion having
been obtained, the overreaching PIP carrier retroactively and prospectively pays nothing.
39

Plaintiff referred to "necessary" as a subjective representation in the opening
Brief. The precise descriptive term is not nearly as important as establishing the
substantive rights and procedural methods. Regardless of terminology, the word
"necessary" only permits an insurer to attempt to prove bad faith or fraud which would
establish a right in the PIP carrier to attempt to prove that it is relieved from its
obligations because of particular, identifiable conduct by the insured (not his doctor). See
Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 57 P.2d 362, 366 (Utah 1936) ("Whether we class
the statements . . . as representations or warranties, the same result is reached . .. .").
The Court could certainly turn a new phrase requiring that expenses be "a bona fide effort
to alleviate and ameliorate the injury," or "wise in the light of the facts known at the time
they were rendered," or "reasonably calculated to shorten and relieve pain and effectuate
14

follow the well-settled law of rescission.40 The burden of proof is placed squarely the
party claiming that "unnecessary" expenses have been incurred — the PIP carrier. Any
claim that the PIP carrier's contractual liability is avoided must set forth the specific facts
supporting such an assertion — not simply some notorious insurance doctor's subjective
assertions about what he "thinks" the insured or his doctor "should have" done. All
investigation must be conducted promptly and in plain view of the insured. The proof of

most rapid recovery," or "a treatment, procedure, or service ordered by a qualified
physician based on the physician's objectively reasonable belief that it will further the
patient's diagnosis and treatment," etc. However, it is difficult to see how any of these
new magic words would effectuate the intent of the legislature and not become invitations
to litigation with overreaching, stubbornly litigious insurance companies. The legislature
has elected to regulate the particular procedural rules by establishing standards governing
reasonable value and permitting the necessity of certain treatments to be determined by
the treating physician (subject to a common law right in the PIP carrier to sue "charlatan"
doctors). To change that balance would frustrate public policy and permit
non-conforming activities to prosper through the choices of others such as "medical
management" companies (Concentra, CorVel, etc.) and insurance doctors (Marble,
Knorpp, etc.) who are the true charlatans — not unlike the $3.49 per minute television
psychics who claim that only they are truly prescient while all others are frauds.
40

The law of rescission can provide a lot of helpful reasoning and guidance, but a
defense for bad faith or fraud would be raised because of misconduct by the insured after
the risk attached; therefore, it is not a technical "rescission." Rescission for material
misrepresentations in the application is a right which was arguably abrogated by the
adoption of the compulsory automobile insurance scheme including no-fault. Rescission
which precludes recovery by innocent injured parties because of the material
misrepresentation of the insured who submitted the application definitely should be
abrogated, but arguably was not. See VanHorn v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 195
(Md. 1994) (noting apparent unanimity of compulsory insurance states holding that
innocent third-parties cannot be denied coverage by avoidance ab initio). Utah law is not
clear because the only case on point relied on a statute which has been repealed. See
Dairyland Insurance Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982) (reversing a summary
judgment regarding rescission and making ambiguous statements doubting third-party
beneficiary status of injured members of the public although prior cases and the
legislature had quite explicitly set forth intended third-party beneficiary status).
15

the insured's specific misconduct will frequently be circumstantial and extremely difficult
to obtain, but that difficulty for the PIP carrier is entirely appropriate and will encourage it
to conduct itself properly because its tendentious breaches will no longer be highly
profitable.41 Under the perceived42 status quo, thousands of claims (approximately 20% of
all claims) are baldly rejected by poorly-trained claims adjusters, insurance doctors,
medical management companies, and personal injury defense attorneys every year. All
future actions to avoid liability under PIP contracts should be rare and limited to egregious
situations.43 This can only happen if the defenses available to PIP carriers are carefully

41

It is highly profitable because Bear River received a premium in exchange for
its promise to accept the risk that it is now attempting to shift back to the insured through
the imposition of an unlawful exclusion.
42

Only 50% - 75% of PIP carriers in Utah, including Bear River, ignore the plain
terms of the no-fault statute.
43

Any and all new arguments that Bear River might attempt to raise in support of
its egregious misconduct or to defeat the propriety of the class-action mechanism were
waived because it only relied on the mere assertions of its insurance doctors relating to
"reasonable and necessary." See Moore v. Energy Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141, 1144
(Utah App. 1991). By way of example, under ERISA, most federal circuit courts have
held that in reviewing decisions of plan administrators under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, the reviewing court may consider only the evidence that the administrators
themselves considered. See, e.g.. Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d
Cir. 1995) ("[A] district court's review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is
limited to the administrative record."); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th
Cir. 1990) (noting that both de novo and arbitrary and capricious standards of review do
"not mandate or permit the consideration of evidence not presented to the administrator").
This concept arises from the recognition that where the condition upon which the PIP
carrier had become obligated had been disregarded without the insured's consent, the
insured was released from any additional obligation (e.g., to "prove" by a preponderance
of the evidence that his medical treatment was "necessary") and the PIP carrier, by
imposing a condition it had no right to impose, had already breached the contract because
it materially impaired the insured's explicit rights. See Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d
16

explained by this Court and based on the plain language of the no-fault statute rather than
the PIP carriers' assertions regarding a who-should-pay question.
IV.

BEAR RIVER'S REFUSAL TO PAY PLAINTIFF'S PIP BENEFITS
VIOLATED ITS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.

The Utah Supreme Court, in McCarren v. Merrill, 389 P.2d 732, 733 (Utah 1964)
noted that the defendant refused to make timely payments as established by the contract,
and held that "the plaintiff was justified in refusing to complete [the contract]." Id.
(addressing the right of rescission of an installment contract wherein the defendant agreed
to pay a plumber as work progressed). The Court also held that the question of whether a
particular breach44 is material45 is a conclusion of law which is not suited for the
speculation of a jury. McCarren, 389 P.2d at 733. More particularly, in installment
contracts, courts look to the four comers of the contract to determine whether "the contract
931, 933 (Utah 1975). Courts have applied the obligation to proceed in good faith to
installment contracts. See, e ^ , Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons. Inc. v. Magna Water and
Sewer Improvement Dist. 613 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980); Wagstaff, 540P.2dat933
(noting that delay of more than one month may constitute a material breach).
44

Time was of the essence in Plaintiffs contract with Bear River. Bear River
refused to pay when it promised to pay (within 30 days). This is a breach. See Christy v.
Guild, 121 P.2d 401 (Utah 1942) ("As we view the evidence, there was nothing to submit
to the jury on the issue of default. There was a clear breach of the contract in regard to
the monthly installments due under the contract."). Bear River claimed that it had not
breached because it had the right to demand that the insured satisfy unstated conditions
regarding "reasonable and necessary." This is bad faith, misrepresentation and fraud, as a
matter of law because the phrase does not permit a PIP carrier to limit its liability (or to
delay payment of PIP benefits) based upon the second opinion of the insurance doctor.
45

Not every minor failure justifies nonperformance and rescission of the contract.
"It must be something so substantial that it could be reasonably deemed to vindicate the
other's refusal to perform." Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt. 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah
1975).
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by its terms makes time of the essence" in completing a given duty. Id. at 733. If time is
of the essence, the breach is material.46 And, of course, time is of the essence under the
no-fault statute.
The essential questions, as applied to this case,47 are whether Bear River's refusal to
provide PIP benefits constituted a breach of the contract so as to impair Plaintiffs rights
and thus to justify a conclusion that the contract was breached and whether the alleged
justification for the delay rendered "it difficult or impossible for [Mr. Prince] to continue
performance and then [attempted to] take advantage of the non-performance [it had]
caused." Zion's Properties. Inc. v. Holt 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975). Both
questions are questions of law which must be answered in the affirmative. There is no
question that Bear River failed to pay Mr. Prince's PIP benefits when due which was a
breach of contract, as Judge Dever finally held. Bear River's assertion that it could not
continue providing PIP benefits until Plaintiff, somehow, proved that his doctors were, in
essence, smarter than Bear River's doctor was quintessential bad faith, as a matter of law.
Bear River's delay was unjustified because the delay was not authorized by the no-fault
46

Bear River and other PIP carriers argue that the 30-day requirement begins to
run whenever they get around to deciding that they want to pay (if this were true, it is a
right that insurance companies should recognize when it comes to their insureds' late
payment of premiums). The no-fault statute actually requires payment within 30 days of
receiving "reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred." Therefore,
"[i]t hardly lies in [Bear River's] mouth to say time was not of the essence . . . We think
such contention to be short on merit." Fullmer v. Baker, 508 P.2d 43 (Utah 1973).
47

Of course, Plaintiff does not seek to rescind the contract, rather he seeks
performance by the other contracting party in conformance with its promises which were
offered in exchange for the sums paid as premiums. Therefore, the foregoing discussion
is not exactly on point, but it is helpful to a discussion of the contract principles involved.
18

statute and the natural and foreseeable effect of its demands was to discourage future
medical treatment by the insured (i.e., prospective denial) and to refuse payment of
expenses which had already been incurred (i.e., retroactive denial) without regard to the
additional expenses and costs which would be caused by the unlawful imposition of the
inexplicable "reasonable and necessary" exclusion (i.e., consequential damages48).
The "evidence" provided by the insurance doctor, therefore, does not create an
objective factual issue49 as to the claim's validity. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.,
918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996) (explaining that because of the complexity and variety of
the facts upon which the fairly debatable determination depends, the legal standard under

48

The consequential damages in this case included Mr. Prince's attorney fees,
interest, $473.00 for his counter-IME, etc. The trial court improperly concluded that
attorney fees and interest were the only consequential damages since Bear River
conclusorily (and incorrectly) asserted that its bad faith and breach of contract were
"moot" in its absurd "motion for determination of attorney fees." Basic, black-letter law
is that late payment does not absolve the breaching party of liability for damages and that
damages for breach of contract include: "general damages, which flow naturally from the
breach, and consequential damages, which, while not an invariable result of breach, were
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the contract was entered into." Castillo
v. Atlanta Cas. Co.. 939 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Utah App. 1997).
49 "[jjhe question of whether Pugh's claim was 'fairly debatable' is a legal
conclusion to be drawn from the trial court's findings rather than a finding in its own
right. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996). The trial
court found that the transmission breakdown was 'covered by the warranty agreement'
and that North American 'delayed unreasonably in . . . paying for covered repairs when
the need was established.' These findings compel the legal conclusion that North
American's liability was crystal clear under the warranty contract and was in no
sense debatable." Pugh v. North Am. Warranty Servs.. Inc., 2000 UT App 121 at n. 4, 1
P.3d 570. The Court of Appeals, in Pugh, also noted that insurance contracts must be in
writing. The "reasonable and necessary" approach advocated by Bear River would, in
essence, transform the injured insured into the insurer of his or her treating doctor's
medical practice in conformity with the post hoc opinion of the insurance doctor.
19

which this determination is made conveys some discretion to trial judges and this Court
will grant the trial court's conclusion some deference50). Bear River made no effort to
show that its actions were "objectively reasonable." Instead, it simply presented the
"facts" which were allegedly established by the insurance doctor's report.
First, Bear River's argument only consists of repeating the words of the rule and
asserting that "evidence establishes"51 the fair debatability of its actions. It is impossible
to determine whether an insurance company's actions were "fairly debatable" if it is
unknown how the insurance company should have acted and what rights, obligations, and
defenses are permitted or required by the no-fault statute.
Bear River simply asserts that it can deny any and all PIP claims so long as its
assertions are tenuously supported by an insurance doctor.52 Therefore, it asserted that its
50

Plaintiff failed to provide this precise standard of review in his opening Brief
The omission was inconsequential because the "fairly debatable" conclusion was made by
the trial court on an unsupported motion for summary judgment.
51

It appears that Bear River asserted that Plaintiffs causes of action were
ineffectual because the "reasonable and necessary" exclusion is "clearly" permissible and
refuses to join the discussion relating to that point of statutory interpretation. Opposition
Brief at p. 33. At the same time, Bear River claims that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover
his attorney fees because the interpretation of the contract has nothing to do with the
question of whether it failed to comply with the contract. See Opposition Brief at p. 40.
In other words, the "fact" that "reasonable and necessary" is "clearly" a permissible
contractual defense defeats all causes of action and, simultaneously, has nothing to do
with the question of its contractual defenses?
52

The opinion of the insurance doctor is, at best, a second opinion and, at worst,
the rankest form of fraud and theft (as defined by statute). "Parties to a contract are
obliged to proceed in good faith and to cooperate in the performance of the contract in
accordance with its expressed intent." Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140, 144 (Utah
1982). Thus, a "party cannot by wilful act or omission make it impossible or difficult for
the other to perform and then invoke the other's nonperformance as a defense." Id
20

self-proclaimed "permitted denial" rendered its actions "fairly debatable" as a matter of
law. See Opposition Brief at pp. 18-21. Bear River ignores its other misconduct such as
attempting to interfere with Mr. Prince's tort claim, its admitted motivation being its
potential difficulty in intercompany arbitration, its admonishment that Mr. Prince should
have ignored his doctor's advice and terminated his treatment pending the insurance
doctor's report,53 its threat that full payment would make Mr. Prince's premiums rise, etc.
The possession of a single legal opinion masquerading as a medical opinion does
not automatically transform bad faith into "fairly debatable" conduct. The plain language
of the test refers to "diligently" getting all necessary information, "properly" evaluating
the claim with reference to a fair review of aU the facts and a correct application of the
relevant contractual obligations and defenses to the facts, and "promptly" paying the
benefits which are due. Bear River only relied on the single biased opinion of Marble.
See Opposition Brief at p. 20. Bear River did not properly apply the law to the facts, and
Bear River still professes that its obligations are necessarily co-extensive with the
subjective legal opinion of its insurance doctor. Bear River did not pay promptly.54
53

In the case of insurance contracts, the duty of good faith is "the essence of what
the insured has bargained and paid for." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 801
(Utah 1985). The insurance carrier has "a duty to investigate, bargain, and settle claims
in good faith." Id. The post hoc assertion that the injured person should have waited for
Bear River's medical advice is antithetical to the idea of "bargaining." (R. 56).
54

Apparently, Bear River requested the insurance doctor's exam on March 11,
1997, the exam was performed on May 12, 1997, and Bear River denied payment for
treatment received beyond March 7, 1997 on May 29, 1997 (i.e., more than 30 days after
receiving proof). On July 23, 1997 Bear River allegedly paid additional amounts which
were incurred between March 7 and March 11. Much, much later Bear River allegedly
paid the remaining amounts it owed on April 16, 1998. None of this comes close to the
21

Second, Bear River presented no evidence in support of its motion for summary
judgment on the "fairly debatable" defense. Indeed, the trial court's order55 states that the
moving party "need not support his motion with affidavits."56 (R. 192).
Third, a "fair debate" is a debate "in court." Bear River is only "in court" because
that was the only remedy available to Plaintiff in response to Bear River's undaunted
reliance on the bald assertions of the insurance doctor. If Bear River had brought a
declaratory judgment action and alleged and attempted to prove that Mr. Prince incurred
medical expenses fraudulently and/or in bad faith, then a "fair debate" might have existed.
V.

JUDGE DEVER'S DECISION TO REDUCE PLAINTIFF'S
ATTORNEY FEES WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

It is axiomatic that everybody is entitled to their own opinions — but not their own
facts. On the outside chance that the truth matters, it should be recognized that Bear River
misrepresented the procedural history of the case, and Judge Dever relied on the

legislative mandate that PIP benefits be paid "monthly as expenses are incurred."
55

Judge Thome's decision to grant Bear River's unsupported motion makes
Justice Callister's comment on a somewhat-similar subject seem second-sighted:
This case constitutes a dangerous precedent, wherein an insurance
company through insinuation and harassment can defeat at its election
any claim for loss sustained by an insured. Furthermore, the [trial
court] has nullified Rule 56(e) [and 56(c)] just as effectively as if it had
been specifically repealed . . . from the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Fox v. Allstate Insurance Company, 453 P.2d 701 (Utah 1969) (Callister J., dissenting).
56

See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Ctr., 2000 UT 90, f 19, 15 P.3d 1030 ("an
insurer is obliged to assess the black-letter law in the jurisdiction in which the claim
arises, and to act accordingly. This obligation to properly assess the law extends to the
legal assertions a party and its counsel make in litigation.").
22

misrepresentations.57 Bear River continues to misrepresent the procedural history of the
case. See Opposition Brief at pp. 40, 42. The trial court rewarded Bear River's
misconduct. This Court should not reward misrepresentations of fact.
The trial court's decision to save this insurance company harmless from its own
intentional misconduct will have the undesirable effect of encouraging "mad dog defense
tactics"58 such as purposeful-incompetence, foot-dragging, chest-beating, intimidation
attempts, etc. The only alleged basis for the district court's misplaced compassion is Bear
River's implausible assertion that:

57

Trial court error, not attorney tactics, was the cause of the attorney fees affidavit
limited to the time incurred only through the first motion. See Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d
892, 901 (Utah App. 1996) (Billings, J., dissenting) ("It is well established that the law
does not require litigants to do a futile or vain act."). The Court ordered only a limited
affidavit addressing the breach of contract claim prior to the date Bear River allegedly
paid the remaining amounts owed; therefore, it would have been futile to provide an
affidavit setting forth all attorney fees incurred. The affidavit of Plaintiff s counsel was
not disputed. See Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736, 742 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that trial
court abused discretion in reducing attorney fee award where proffered evidence of fees
was adequate and entirely undisputed). The trial court's reduction was incomprehensible.
"Generally, this court has been critical of judges who simply reduce a fee award 'ad
hoc.'" Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 1999 UT App 109, ^ 17, 978 P.2d 470. The
trial court failed to make findings to explain the factors which were considered relevant in
arriving at an attorney fee award, but the "preparation of the complaint" language was
taken directly from Bear River's assertions. "[U]nless the court offers an explanation for
the reduction of the attorney fees requested in a case where there is adequate and
uncontroverted evidence in the record to support the fees, it abuses its discretion." Id.
On remand, all attorney fees should be awarded.
58

Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 2001 UT 89 at % 31. The silly
tactics used by Bear River are intended to raise the cost of litigating a PIP claim to make
it unprofitable for any attorney who expects to make more than a couple of pennies per
hour. If an attorney were to take a PIP case on a contingency basis and adhere to the
"rules" proposed by Bear River, its misconduct would never come to light.
23

The plaintiff did nothing to pursue his cause of action for breach of contract
in the underlying case. Other than filing the original complaint, there was no
discovery, motions, memoranda, or arguments presented to the trial court
regarding the breach of contract claim.
Opposition Brief at p. 40. The record, of course, exposes Bear River's dissembling (see
Plaintiffs opening Brief), but the district court relied on Bear River's assertion without,
apparently, reading Plaintiffs memoranda or referring to the court's own file.
Even conceding Bear River its own opinion regarding whether "reasonable and
necessary" addresses the breach of contract issue, the facts still demonstrate that Bear
River tried (successfully) to mislead the trial court. Was there discovery? Yes. (See, e.g.,
R. 201,214,431-472). Were there motions? Yes. (See, e.g., R. 73V Were there
memoranda? Yes. (See, e.g., R. 20-72). Was there an interlocutory appeal? Yes. (See,
e.g., R. 194V Were there arguments? Yes. (See, e.g., R. 189V Was there an Order which
was prepared by Defendant's counsel which explicitly acknowledged that Plaintiffs initial
motion for partial summary judgment directly addressed his breach of contract claims?
Yes. (R. 190). Does the interpretation of the rights, obligations, and defenses set forth in
the contract have direct bearing on the breach of contract claim? Yes. Was Bear River's
statement that "nothing" was done the truth? No.
Even if fees59 were only properly awarded for the breach of contract claim, courts

59

The attorney fees and interest awards authorized by Section 309 are not punitive
in nature. They function as PIP coverage enforcement mechanisms to promote effective
enforcement of the ordinance on behalf of the consumer. Awarding attorney fees and
interest to the accident victim who is wronged by the primary insurer's refusal to honor
its PIP coverage vindicates the statute's compensatory purpose for the benefit of those
wrongfully denied the mandatory statutory coverage.
24

should award "fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees may not have been
incurred on strictly compensable issues, because proof of the compensable and
non-compensable claims overlapped." Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 1999 UT App
109, Tf 19, 978 P.2d 470. Bear River acknowledges that the vast majority of fees were
incurred debating the "reasonable and necessary" affirmative defense which it raised.
Bear River's assertion that such a defense was valid (and its absurd assertion that it gave
rise to a question of fact) constituted its primary argument in support of its motion for
summary judgment and this appeal. The Foote case relied on by Bear River is easily
distinguishable because Bear River's asserted defense underlies all Plaintiffs causes of
action and nearly all Defendant's counter-arguments. Because Bear River's defense was
not legally sufficient, it breached its contract. Because it misrepresented the rights and
obligations under the contract, Bear River acted in bad faith and committed fraud.
CONCLUSION
The district court's orders should be reversed, and all attorney fees and costs
incurred awarded. Bear River breached its contract, acted in bad faith (a tort), breached its
fiduciary duties, and committed fraud. All conclusions are drawn from purely legal
questions because Bear River's misconduct is not disputed. The district court should be
instructed to permit amendment of the complaint and to certify this case as a class action.
DATED this /fc

day of November, 2001.
CARR & WAfiDOUPS

(

TRENT J. WADDOUPS

Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant
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ARGUMENTS
L
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTSMOTION FOR A PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION OF MISTI ERNST.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The State maintains that this Court should review the trial court's denial of the
psychiatric evaluation of Misti Ernst for an abuse of discretion. State's brief at 1, 20.
The State contends that this level of deference is appropriate given the delicacy and
intrusion involved when courts question a witness's sanity. State's brief at 20.
While Calliham agrees that all trial and appellate courts considering the
propriety of psychiatric evaluations of witnesses should act carefully to protect the
privacy interests of the witnesses, e.g., Stone v. Stone. 431 P.2d 802 (Utah 1967),
this consideration does not justify any added deference to the trial court's ruling,

which was based solely on his review of the preliminary hearing transcript (R. 84-86).
Because this Court routinely applies the law to transcripts,1 the Court is at least
in a position equal to that of the trial court on this issue in this particular case, and
should review the ruling for correctness. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 at 936,
939 (Utah 1994)(in discussing how standards of review are selected, the Court noted
that more deference is due when issues involve demeanor and credibility, because
the appellate record does not adequately convey these things).
B. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD FOR ORDERING EVALUATIONS
The State and Calliham are in agreement on the relevant standard to justify
a psychiatric evaluation: Calliham was required to show that there was "a substantial
doubt that a witness is capable of understanding and appreciating the duty to tell the
truth, or that he is able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with
reasonable accuracy." State v. Hubbard. 601 P.2d 929, 930 (Utah 1979). See, e.g.,
State's Brief at 21 ?

Cf., e.g., State v. Vincent. 883 P.2d 278, 282 (Utah 1994). In selecting
standard of review for indigence determinations, the Court stated, u[T]he more the
application of a legal rule depends on facts that the trial judge is uniquely able to
evaluate, such as credibility, the less the likelihood that an appellate court can
effectively review the application of the law to those facts on a cold record."
2

The State questions the correctness of State v. Braun. 787 P.2d 1336, 1343
(Utah App. 1990), which indicates that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35 permits trial
courts to order mental examinations in criminal cases, because that rule governs
parties or persons "in the custody or legal control of a party." State's Brief at 16 n.5.
Given the State's ability to subpoena witnesses under U.R.Cr.P. 14 and Utah
Code Ann. § 77-22-1 ef seq., and to prosecute for obstruction of justice pursuant to
2

The parties are also in agreement that the trial court's choice of State v.
Bakalov. 1999 UT45, 979 P.2d 799, as the "most recent pronouncement of the Utah
Supreme Court in this area" was incorrect.3 Bakalov did not involve a court-ordered

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306, the State's witnesses are fairly characterized as being
in the State's control.
Particularly because Misti Ernst's plea bargain, reducing her murder charge
to a third degree felony attempted obstruction of justice with a prosecutorial
recommendation of probation including one year of jail time, was premised on her
testimony (R. 49; P.H. 6-8), she was within the State's control.
3

The trial court ruled as follows:
The most recent pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court in
this area is State v. Bakalov. [1999 UT 45, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah 1999),]
the primary prosecution witness suffered from disassociative identity
disorder ("DID"). Characteristics of DID include amnesia and memory
gaps. Competing multiple personalities, each with its own behavior
pattern and memories, compete for dominance within the patient. The
Supreme Court ruled that evidence of mental illness is material when
it may reasonably cast doubt on the witness' ability or willingness to tell
the truth. The court therefore decided that the prosecutor should have
disclosed the DID. However, since it was established after trial that the
witness' ability to recall the crime in question had not been affected by
her illness, the conviction was affirmed.
In this case, the only hint of mental illness is the adoption by the
witness of defense counsel's characterization of her dreams as
"hallucinations." There is no evidence of mental illness preceding the
crime. The transcript does not suggest to the court that Misty [sic]
suffers from mental illness. To the contrary, Misty [sic] appears capable
of distinguishing between what happened, what she dreamed, what she
worried about, what she told officers on different occasions, what she
wanted to say, what she heard from others, and what Jordan and his
brother might want her to say. If the court were to order a psychiatric
examination based on Misty's [sic] preliminary hearing testimony, an
examination would be required in virtually all cases.
Jordan's suggestion that a psychiatric examination might disclose
a propensity to lie runs up against the prohibition against using expert
witnesses as human lie detectors. Similarly, though Jordan is entitled

mental exam of a witness, but involved a prosecutor's failure to produce exculpatory
mental health records of its chief witness, and was thus inapposite to the issue
before the trial court, whether to order Misti Ernst to undergo an evaluation. See
State's Brief at 18.4
The State does not contest the other legal error in the trial court's ruling which
premised the denial of the evaluation in part on the trial court's erroneous view of the
scope of expert testimony in this context.5 While the Callihams may not have been
entitled to call an expert witness on the issue of Misti's credibility under Utah Rule of
Evidence 608(a),8 expert witnesses may be used to inform the jury about a witness'
to introduce reputation testimony about Misti's credibility, he is probably
not entitled to attack her credibility with an expert psychiatric witness
unless a mental illness has been established. Absent evidence of
actual mental illness, the court will not order an examination to fish for
it.
The motion is denied.
(R. 84-86).
4

The fact that the trial court's ruling did not apply the correct standard is
perhaps the best reason to review his ruling without deference.
5

The trial court ruled as follows:
Jordan's suggestion that a psychiatric examination might disclose
a propensity to lie runs up against the prohibition against using expert
witnesses as human lie detectors. Similarly, though Jordan is entitled
to introduce reputation testimony about Misti's credibility, he is probably
not entitled to attack her credibility with an expert psychiatric witness
unless a mental illness has been established.
See R. 84-86.
6

Rule 608 provides as follows:
4

cognitive functioning and abilities, and as long as the experts do not give direct
subjective opinions about witness credibility, the fact that jurors may draw adverse
inferences about witness credibility from the expert testimony does not render the
expert testimony inadmissible under the rule. See, e.g., State v. Adams. 2000 UT
42 , 5 P.3d 642, 645-46.7

(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness
has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness* privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to
credibility.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence
otherwise adduced.
7

In Adams, this Court affirmed the Utah Court of Appeals' analysis condoning
an expert's testifying about whether a child sexual abuse victim was capable of
creating the allegations, or of repeating the allegations introduced to her by a third
person, because the expert did not specifically offer an opinion as to her credibility,
but merely provided facts from which the jury might have drawn positive inferences
about her credibility.
5

C. APPLYING THE LAW
The disputed issue before the Court is whether, in applying the correct
Hubbard standard, the preliminary hearing transcript establishes "a substantial doubt
that [Misti Ernst was] capable of understanding and appreciating the duty to tell the
truth, or that [she was] able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with
reasonable accuracy." State v. Hubbard. 601 P.2d 929, 930 (Utah 1979).
The State does not contest that the preliminary hearing transcript includes
statements reflecting Misti's inability to distinguish truth from falsehood, and to follow
the oath she took as a witness.8
The State defends the trial court's ruling that Ms. Ernst did not truly hallucinate
about the subject matter of her testimony, but only adopted defense counsel's term
"hallucinations" in describing her "dreams," "nightmares," and "inevitable images and
thoughts conjured up in Misti's mind from reliving and imagining the events of that
evening." State's brief at 24.
Assuming that this Court agrees that reference to the DSM-IV-R and the

s

For instance, at the preliminary hearing, when Mr. Schultz asked Misti why she
was changing her story, she explained that her lawyer told her she had to tell the
complete truth with exact detail (P.H. at 52). She maintained that she had been
telling the truth before the recess, but just did not tell every little thing she knew (P.H.
at 52).
A review of her preliminary hearing testimony, in Part II of the Statement of
Facts, supra at *, confirms that Ernst was not omitting details, but was lying in at
least one of her differing versions of events relayed at the preliminary hearing.
6

Department of Justice websites was improper,9 the State does not object to
Calliham's reference to Black's Law Dictionary, which defines halludnation as
follows:
Hallucination
/hal(y)-uws3n-eyshsn/. An apparently real sensory
perception (auditory or visual) without any real external stimuli to cause
it; commonly experienced by psychotics. It may occur with relation to
any of the special senses, e.g. hearing sounds or seeing things that do
not exist. The perception by any of the senses of an object which has
no existence. The conscious recognition of a sensation of sight,
hearing, feeling, taste, or smell which is not due to any impulse
received by the perceptive apparatus from without, but arises within the
perceptive apparatus itself.
9

Calliham disagrees that his reliance on these reference materials amounts to
improperly inserting evidence in his brief. But see State's Brief at 25. On appeal, it
is appropriate to research and cite to such reference materials in order to inform the
Court of technical issues which require eluddation. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 24
(a)(3) (recognizing that parties may cite other authorities in addition to cases,
statutes, rules and constitutional provisions).
This Court often refers to such reference materials in published opinions. See,
e.g., Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 858 P.2d 970, 975 and n.5 (Utah
1993)(refem'ng to the DSM-III in the course of observing, "Given recent medical
advances in the fields of psychiatry and psychology, it is now possible to establish
emotional illness with some degree of certainty."); State v. Boyd. 2001 UT 30 fl 18
and n.2, 25 P.3d 985, 991 (in addressing absence of court reporter in rape trial, this
Court quoted from a website, stating "'Computer integrated courtrooms enable court
reporters to "create . . . records through computer-aided transcription . . . that are
instantaneously sent to computers at the judge's bench, on the attorney's tables, and
[at] other strategic courtroom locations."^.
None of the cases cited by the State on the issue of striking improper matters
from the brief involved similar reliance on reference materials. See State v. Plieoo.
1999 UT 8, % 7, 974 P.2d 279 (appellant improperly included evidentiary documents
in his brief); Wilderness Bldg. Sys. Inc. v. Chapman. 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah
1985)(parties did not order transcripts and trial exhibits were the only evidence
before the Court, the Court noted that it would dedde the case on the basis of the
record before the Court); In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 862 (Utah 1996)(discussing
what must be induded in the record on appeal from Judidal Conduct Commission).
7

This definition describes the experiences attested to by Ernst, and confirms
that her preliminary hearing testimony raised "a substantial doubt that [Misti Ernst
was] capable of understanding and appreciating the duty to tell the truth, or that [she
was] able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with reasonable accuracy."
State v. Hubbard. 601 P.2d 929, 930 (Utah 1979).
Regardless of which label is used to refer to the phenomena experienced by
Misti Ernst, the record clearly demonstrates that Misti could not distinguish between
reality and the phenomena (P.H. at 59-62). The record also demonstrates that Misti
had dreamed or hallucinated repeatedly about Eaton seeing her and talking to her
after his death and about being at the scene of his death, but did not initially realize
that her hallucinations or dreams were hallucinations or dreams, and had told the
police her hallucinations or dreams before she recognized them as such, and also
told them hearsay from third parties and lies without identifying her statements to
them as such (P.H. at 57, 59-61).
The preliminary hearing transcript demonstrates that Misti was constructing
her versions of the events at the preliminary hearing

by reviewing these

hallucination and hearsay-filled statements to the police.10
10

Misti testified that the changes in her testimony at the preliminary hearing
stemmedfromhaving watched her taped statements to the police during the recess,
which refreshed her recollection and supplemented what independent recall she had
(P.H. at 91-92).
The prosecutor corrected the record, indicating that she had listened to an
audiotape, but did not see a videotape (P.H. at 93).
8

The record also demonstrates that this unusual construction of testimony
continued at trial. At trial, she testified that she had done substantial preparation for
her trial testimony, and had determined the true events by reviewing her prior
statements to the police (R. 374 at 90)."
The State does not address or contest Calliham's contention that Misti Ernst
should not have testified because her testimony was fundamentally unreliable as a
result of her unique memory reconstruction process. See State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d
1203 (Utah), cert, denied. 494 U.S. 1018 (1990);12 State v. Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116
(Utah 1989);13 Franklin v. Stevenson. 1999 UT 61, 987 P.2d 22 (Utah 1999).14
She then explained that she had been trying to black the events out, but knew
what happened once she heard her story on the tape with the police (P.H. at 94).
At trial, she testified that she had done substantial preparation for her trial testimony,
and had determined the true events by reviewing her prior statements to the police
(R. 374 at 90).
Likewise, at the preliminary hearing, Misti testified that the changes in her
testimony stemmed from having watched her taped statements to the police during
the recess, which refreshed her recollection and supplemented what independent
recall she had (P.H. at 91-92).
The prosecutor corrected the record, indicating that she had listened to an
audiotape, but did not see a videotape (P.H. at 93).
She then explained that she had been trying to black the events out, but knew
what happened once she heard her story on the tape with the police (P.H. at 94).
12

In Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah), the Court found that a witness could not testify
because the witness had undergone hypnotic therapy to enhance memories of the
crime. The Court characterized the testimony as "the product of scientific
intervention^ and inadmissible in the absence of foundation to prove the reliability
of hypnotic memory enhancement, ki- at 1211.
13

In Mitchell, the Court overruled the trial court's admission of hypnotically
9

While the State faults Calliham for referring to the DSM-IV-R and Department
of Justice websites, and in failing to introduce "expert testimony explaining what
hallucinations are, the possibility that someone like Misty could be suffering from
them, or the effect they might have on a person's ability to remember and relate
events," State's Brief at 24-25, the shortcomings in the record are attributable to the
trial court's refusal to order a mental examination of Ernst, for Calliham, an indigent
criminal defendant.
Even if Calliham were not indigent, and had funds to procure his own expert,
courts routinely recognize the low probative value and speculative nature of
testimony of mental health experts who testify about subjects they have not
examined. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Felix. 569 F.2d 1274, 1282 (3 rd
Cir. 1978).15

enhanced testimony, finding that the testimony was inherently unreliable. Id. at
1119.
14

In Franklin v. Stevenson. 1999 UT 61, 987 P.2d 22 (Utah 1999), the plaintiff
sued the defendant for alleged sexual abuse. The plaintiff had undergone many
sessions of therapy, wherein the therapist used various relaxation techniques to
evoke the memories which formed the basis of the civil suit. This Court found that
the plaintiffs "recovered memories" were the product of "scientific intervention," and
held that because the recovery methods employed by the therapist were unreliable,
the plaintiffs testimony was tainted and inadmissible. 1999 UT 61 at fflf 19 and 20,
987 P.2d at 28-29.
15

In Felix, the Third Circuit Court affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion for
mental examination of defendant, which was based on affidavit of defense counsel.
The court explained,
The fundamental weakness of the affidavit is that it does not point to
10

The State discusses evidence from the preliminary hearing corroborating Misti
Ernst's testimony in an effort to uphold the trial court's ruling. State's Brief at 32-33.
Just as the absence of corroborating evidence does not call for a mental evaluation
of a witness, the presence of corroborating evidence has little direct bearing on the
individual assessment required by Hubbard, whether there is "a substantial doubt
that a witness is capable of understanding and appreciating the duty to tell the truth,
or that he is able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with reasonable
accuracy." State v. Hubbard. 601 P.2d 929, 930 (Utah 1979).
The State has presented no case law indicating that consideration of
corroborating evidence is appropriate in assessing whether or not to order a mental
evaluation of a witness, and given that most mental evaluations will be sought prior
to trial, trial courts will rarely have a firm grasp on whether there is evidence to
corroborate a witness's testimony.
At the time of the preliminary hearing in this case, there was no need for the

any specific evidence of mental incapacity or illness. It recounts in a
summary fashion, inter alia, the defendant's criminal record, his history
of disciplinary difficulties as a Corrections Officer with the Department
of Public Safety, his appearance of excitation in conferences with
counsel, his "obsession" with Gary Gilmore, the convicted kilter in Utah
who sought his own electrocution, the apparent opinion of a psychiatrist
(who did not examine Felix) that the killing of Industrious might have
been caused by mental illness, and the embarrassment of counsel
when his client engaged in a lengthy "diatribe" in court during the
sentencing proceedings. None of these points involves definite medical
or psychiatnc testimony from one who is professionally qualified to pass
judgment on the matter in question, and who personally examined the
defendant
jd. (emphasis added).
11

defense to challenge whether there was evidence to corroborate Misti Ernst's
testimony, because the standard for a bindover in criminal cases is so low. See,
e.g., State v. Talbot. 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)(at preliminary hearing,
magistrate must view all evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the
prosecution).
To the degree that this corroborative analysis is appropriate, Calliham refers
the Court to his opening brief statement of facts, which discusses the physical
evidence and investigation and evidence contradicting and corroborating Misti
Ernst's pivotal testimony in detail. In short, her testimony was key to the conviction,
and yet largely uncorroborated and contradicted.
D. PRESERVATION OF THE CONFRONTATION ISSUE
The State argues that constitutional confrontation claim was waived because
it was not presented to the trial court. State's Brief at 34.
While parties certainly do have a duty to object to procedures in the trial
courts, this Court often addresses constitutional issues on appeal, in the absence of
specific mention of constitutional implications in the trial court. For instance, in State
v. ViHarreat. 857 P.2d 949, 957 (Utah App. 1993), the court of appeals expressly
found that trial counsel preserved the constitutional confrontation issues involved
when a co-participant in the defendant's crime took the stand, but refused to answer
a series of leading questions by the prosecutor. ]d. And on certiorari in State v.
ViHarreal. 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995), this Court noted that this process occurred over
12

the objection of the defendant, and then fully addressed the violation of the
defendant's constitutionalrightsto confrontation involved in this testimony, and found
that these constitutional errors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id- at
422-426. By examining the second volume of the transcript in VHIarreal. this Court
can confirm that trial counsel there did not raise the confrontation issue, but
repeatedly objected to the procedure in the trial court.16
The State argues that Calliham did not argue plain error or exceptional
circumstances. State's brief at 34.
Actually, the first footnote of Calliham's opening brief correctly argued plain
error, stating,
To the extent that any issue raised herein was not properly preserved
at trial, Calliham relies on the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel
doctrines to raise the issues on appeal.
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful
error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although
the obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error
occurred which is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial
court. £ge, e ^ , State v. Eldredqe. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert,
denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate for correction under the
plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138,1140
(10th Cir.), cert, denied. 145 LEd.2d 343 (1999).
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Calliham must
demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable
16

Vfllarreal's trial counsel objected to the leading nature of the questions, to the
presentation of hearsay, to the prosecutor's presentation of a story through
questioning when the prosecutor had no evidence to support the story, to the lack
of foundation to support the questioning, and to the danger of confusing the jury with
the questioning (T.2 at 218-223).
13

standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient performance
was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), certdenied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). The prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance
of counsel doctrine requires proof of a reasonable probability of a different
result in the absence of the objectively deficient performance. See e.g. State
v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988).
Applying the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines here,
when the trial court was faced with a motion for a psychiatric evaluation of Misti
Ernst, the memorandum explaining the need for the evaluation (R. 56-61), and the
preliminary hearing transcript, it should have been obvious to the trial court and
counsel that the denial of the evaluation would substantially hamper Calliham's
ability to confront Misti and to present his defense.2!
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The law explaining the constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a
defense is basic and was well established at the time of the trial court's ruling, testify
in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witness against him{.]
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant
part,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness against
him {.]
See also Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 (Utah due process provision); United
States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1 (federal due process provision); Utah Code
Ann. § 77-1-6(providing parallel statutory protections); Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S. 308
(1974)(Court found that the defendant was entitled to cross-examine the state's
witness regarding his bias stemming from pressures he faced as a juvenile
probationer, despite the traditional privacy and confidentiality afforded to juvenile
records); Crane v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1985)("Whether rooted directly in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi.
[410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)], or in the Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses
of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas. 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967); Davis v.

14

The prejudice caused by the error in denying the evaluation is fully addressed
in Point I subpoint E of Calliham's opening brief.
E. REVERSIBLE NATURE OF THE ERROR
The State makes no claim of harmless error.
Whether this Court recognizes the constitutional nature of the error and
requires the government to prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or
whether the Court considers the error to be non-constitutional, requiring Calliham to
prove the harmfulness of the error, the error was reversible. See Opening Brief of
Appellant, Point I, subpoint E.

1L
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SEVERANCE.
A. PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
The State argues that because counsel for Jordan conceded that Jordan had
Alaska. 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.' California v. Trombetta. 467
U.S. at 465; cf Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 684-685 (1984) ('The
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines
the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment'). We break no new ground in observing that an essential component
of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. In re Oliver. 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948); Grannis v. Ordean. 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)."); Christiansen v. Harris. 163
P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945)(an essential of due process provided by article I section
7 of the Utah Constitution is the "fair opportunity to submit evidence."); State v.
Harding. 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981)(TT]he defendant's right to present all
competent evidence In his defense is a right guaranteed by the due process clause
of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7[.]"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (providing
parallel statutory protection).
15

no basis for seeking a severance, and because counsel for Jordan did not join in the
motion for a mistrial made by counsel for Terril after Misti Ernst relayed hearsay in
violation of a prior court order, Jordan did not provide the trial court with an
opportunity to correct the error, and has waived issues related to the severance.
State's Brief at 35-36.
The purpose of the waiver doctrine is to insure that trial courts have the first
opportunity to correct errors prior to appeals, to conserve judicial resources which
would otherwise be expended in the event of a new trial.

See, e.g., State v.'

McCardeif. 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982).
The fact that counsel for Jordan conceded prior to trial that he had no basis
for a severance does not translate into waiver of all issues, particularly in light of
Jordan's counsel's repeated objections to the trial court's later rulings that the
witnesses should be required to testify inaccurately, and that counsel for Jordan
could not cross-examine them fully

(R. 374 at 116, 120, 121, 178). These

objections certainly gave the trial court the opportunity to avoid these specific errors.
Whether or not counsel for Jordan expressly joined in the mistrial motion
relating to Misti Ernst's testimony, the trial court ruled on the merits of that issue, and
discussed its rationale for why neither defendant was prejudiced by its designed
course of action (R. 374 at 116-117).
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d) empowers trial courts to relieve parties
of waiver of issues and rule on the merits. See id. ("Failure of the defendant to timely
16

raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial
or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for good
cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.").
This Court recognizes that under this rule, if a trial court rules on an issue and
ignores apparent waiver of the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal. See, State
v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048,1052-53 (Utah 1991)(triaJ court chose to ignore waiver
of objection to admission of evidence and ruled on the merits, therefore the issue
was preserved for appeal). Trial courts need not make findings of good cause
before relieving parties of the effects of waiver.

See. State v. Belgard. 830 P.2d

264, 265-66 (Utah 1992)(when trial court held evidentiary hearing post-trial and ruled
on the merits, issue regarding admissibility of evidence was preserved for appeal,
despite the fact that the trial court did not make a finding of good cause).
In the circumstances of this case, wherein the trial court considered the
positions of both defendants in denying the motion for a mistrial, and the options
open to him to provide a severance, separate juries or redaction (R. 374 at 116-117),
the issue is preserved. See, e.g., Matsamas. supra.
B. MERITS OF THE ISSUE
Jordan does not claim a Bruton violation by virtue of the admission of his own
statements. See State's Brief at 37.
Rather, he claims that when the trial court ordered that the jaiihouse
informants testify inaccurately to make it appear that Jordan was the person solely
17

responsible for Eaton's murder, and forbade counsel for Jordan from crossexamining them fully (R. 374 at 113-121,171-174; R. 314 at 115-,), this resulted in
a due process violation18 and a confrontation violation.19
IS

See, e.g.. Walker v. State. 624 P.2d 687, 690-91 (Utah1981)("lt is an accepted
premise in American jurisprudence that any conviction obtained by the knowing use
of false testimony is fundamentally unfair and totally incompatible with 'rudimentary
demands of justice.' The proposition is firmly established that a conviction obtained
through the use of false evidence known to be such by representatives of the State,
must fall under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I,
Section 7, of the Utah State Constitution, if there is any reasonable likelihood that
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. The same result
obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go
uncorrected when it appears. This standard derives from both the prosecutorial
misconduct and more importantly the fact that the use of false evidence involves a
corruption of the truth seeking function of the trial process.")(footnotes omitted);
State v. Hewitt. 689 P,2d 22, 24 (Utah 1984)("lt is undisputed that a criminal
conviction procured by the knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair
and violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Art. 1, §
7 of the Utah State Constitution. The conviction must be vacated if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of
the jury. ")(footnotes omitted).
19

It is fundamental that to ensure accuracy and reliability, testimony
should be given under oath in open court with the opportunity for crossexamination. State v. Sanders. 27 Utah 2d 354, 359, 496 P.2d 270,
273 (1972). Although the confrontation clauses of the state and federal
constitutions protect similar values, those clauses are not coterminous
with the hearsay rule and its exceptions. 2e_e Idaho v. Wright. 497 U.S.
805, 814, 111 L Ed. 2d 638, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990); California v.
Green. 399 U.S. 149, 155-56, 26 L Ed. 2d 489, 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970);
State v. Lenaburo. 781 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989). As a general
proposition, exceptions to the hearsay rule do not violate the
confrontation clause. On the other hand, the right of a defendant to
confront an accuser may bar evidence that might otherwise be
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Wright. 497 U.S. at
814: see Green. 399 U.S. at 155-56.
State v. ViHarreal. 889 P.2d 419, 424 (Utah 1995).
18

The State argues that if there had been a separate trial, Jordan's statements
would have been admitted without redactions, as confessions. State's Brief at 42
through 43.
In assessing this argument, this Court should bear in mind that Jordan's
statements ail came from jailhouse informants who, as a class, are biased by a need
to curry favor with the State, and are thus notoriously unreliable.20

Had the

witnesses been permitted to testify truthfully, and had defense counsel been given
authority to fully cross-examine these witnesses, there is no telling what they might
have said, or what a jury might have thought of their testimony.21 Compare State
v. Telford. 940 P.2d 522, 526 (Utah 1997)(defendant's redacted statement was
made to and relayed to the jury by a police officer).
The State argues that this Court should not base a reversal on state
constitutional grounds in this case, because the state constitutional briefing is

20

See, e.g., Crowe v. State. 441 P.2d 90, 95-96 (Nev. 1968)(
"[Rjecognizing that the use of informers is a dirty tactic for a dirty business that
may raise serious questions of credibility, we think the defendant is entitled to
considerable latitude to probe credibility by cross-examination and to have the
issue submitted to the jury with careful instructions cautioning them of the care
which must be taken in weighing such testimony. On Lee v. United States. [343
U.S. 747 (1952)].").
21

Because the informants' statements were not tape or audio-recorded, there
is no guarantee as to what they truly said. One of the jail informants testified that
the police report was inaccurate in recording his version of Jordan's admissions (R.
374 at 195-96).
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inadequate. State's Brief at 43 n.2, citing State v. Seaie. 853 P.2d 862, 873 n.6
(Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993).
In Seaie. the Appellant provided no separate argument or analysis to justify
a state constitutional ruling. See id.
In contrast, Calliham has thoroughly reviewed the relevant federal law and
provided this Court with this object lesson in why the federal law is unacceptable the redaction method of dealing with co-defendant's confessions risks or results in
judicial evidence tampering and perjury. This Court has previously adopted a state
constitutional argument with less briefing than this,22 and can rightly do so when
there is a logical need for the ruling and the state constitutional provisions and law
are consonant with the ruling.
C. REVERSIBLE NATURE OF THE ERROR
The State does not claim that the error was harmless, or attempt to show it
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as it must with constitutional errors, see,
Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
Calliham maintains that the errors involved in the jailhouse informant
testimony were harmful, even under a non-constitutional standard. See Opening

22

See State v. DeMiile. 756 P.2d 81, 84 and n.3 (Utah 1997)(adopting
State's argument that effect of prayer on juror deliberations cannot be considered
in juror affidavit, because this might impinge on the jurors' state constitutional
right under Article I § 4 to serve without a religious test). See generally Appellee's
brief in DeMiile. case number 860532 (containing very little state constitutional
analysis).
20

Brief of Appellant at Point II subpoint B.

UL
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING GORY PHOTOGRAPHS OF EATON'S CORPSE.
The parties are in agreement as to the governing law on gruesome
photographs, see, e ^ , State's Brief at 43-46.
it is for this Court to now view the evidence and determine whether the
admission of the photographs can be affirmed under the relevant law.
Calliham maintains all positions set forth in the opening brief regarding the
inadmissibiiity of the photographs, which refute the majority of the State's arguments
without further elaboration. See Opening Brief of Appellant at Point III.
The State devotes over twelve pages of its brief to its argument that the Court
should overrule the Cloud line of cases recognizing that certain types of evidence are
presumptively prejudicial under rule 403. State's Brief at 120-132.
This Court should reject this argument because the Ctoud line of cases is well
reasoned and persuasive, and serves the vital goal of insuring the reliability of the
proceedings by protecting jurors from evidence which has no special probative value
to the issues they must determine, but which carries a powerful tendency to arouse
juror emotions to the degree that the legitimate deliberative process is overridden.
See, generally, e.g., State v. Cloud. 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986).
While the State's nose count of other jurisdictions may leave this Court in a
distinctive position of requiring the lower courts to insure the reliability of the
21

deliberative process in cases wherein these highly prejudidal types of evidence are
available, this Court is not bound to follow lockstep in the footsteps of other courts.
The Cloud line of cases is well-established and well known to the bench and
bar in this state, and deliberations in Utah are more reliable as a result of this
jurisprudence.

The Cloud line of cases is but one example of unique Utah

jurisprudence requiring trial courts to safeguard the legitimacy of trials by rigorously
screening questionable evidence.23

23

This Court has interpreted Article 1 § 7 of the Utah Constitution, the due
process provision, as requiring exdusion of unreliable eyewitness identification
evidence which is likely to be unduly impressive to jurors in State v. Ramirez. 817
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). This provision of the State constitution requires an inquiry into
the merits of the case to be adjudicated, see generally Christiansen v. Harris. 163
P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945), and supports this Court's dedsion in Cloud, which seeks
to shield jurorsfromevidence with a high propensity to skew the deliberative process
away from the merits of the case, based on the emotional reactions of the jurors to
the evidence.
This Court likewise sets uniquely high state standards for the admission of
expert testimony, requiring that trial courts verify the validity of expert testimony
before jurors are exposed to such influential evidence. See, e.g., State v.
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 398 n.7 and 400 (Utah 1989)(in assessing admissibility
of scientific evidence, trial court is to determine if techniques and prindples
underlying expert testimony are inherently reliable, if the techniques and prindples
have been properly applied, and if the evidence is admissible under rule 403); State
v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1996)(maintaining Rimmasch standard, despite
United States Supreme Court's less rigorous interpretation of the parallel and
verbatim ruie of evidence 702).
22

THE TRIAL COURTS REMOVAL OF QUALIFIED JURORS
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Because the parties have provided this Court with the voir dire of prospective
jurors Reiily and Steele, this Court may now proceed to determine whether the trial
court acted correctly in removing Juror Reiily for cause on his own motion and over
the objection of the defense after offering to keep her on if the prosecutor wanted her
on the panel (R. 400 at 182), see generally, State v. Sevboldt. 236 P. 225 (Utah
1925); and whether the court acted beyond the limits of reasonability in granting the
prosecutor's challenge for cause of Juror Steele over the objection of the defense,
see State v. Archuletta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1240 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979
(1993).
The Court should not grant trial courts broad discretion in removing jurors for
cause on their own motion, Sevbold. because unchecked discretion to remove jurors
by the trial courts is inconsistent with the policy of Utah law to extend the opportunity
of jury service to all citizens equally,24 and inconsistent with the plain language of
^Utah Code Ann. §78-46-2 states,
It is the policy of this state that persons selected for jury service be
selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the
county, and that ail qualified citizens have the opportunity in
accordance with this chapter to be considered for service and have
the obligation to serve when summoned for that purpose.
See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3 ("A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt
23

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18, which grants the right to make for-cause
challenges to the parties, not the court.25
B. PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE
The State contends that this Court should not adopt a presumption of prejudice
when a trial court improperly grants for-cause challenges, and argues as a policy
matter that such a presumption would run contrary to this Court's admonitions to trial
courts to grant questionable for-cause challenges. State's Brief at 80-81.
The State's argument that the expedient of "errfingj on the side of caution in
ruling on for-cause challenges" "applies to prospective jurors of questionable bias for
either the defendant or the prosecution" is lacking supporting authority. State's Brief
at 80.
The policy of erring on the side of caution actually serves the interest in
conservation of judicial resources which are expended in the event of a retrial
required by unnecessary errors at trial, a concern which does not arise when the
jurors left on the panel appear to be biased for the defense or against the

from jury service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
occupation, disability, or economic status.").
25

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 (c)(2) currently extends the right to make forcause challenges to the prosecution and the defense, not the court. See id. (... "All
challenges for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the
defense."). This rule is sensible, given that trial courts are often not in a position to
anticipate the issues which will arise at trial, and are best suited to impartially
resolving challenges for cause by the parties most familiar with the case.
24

prosecution in criminal cases, because the prosecution generally cannot appeal from
an acquittal or conviction.
Particularly in this case, wherein the trial court did not just grant a for-cause
challenge, but removed a juror sua sponte over defense objection and with
prosecutorial veto power, the State's concern about "flying in the face" of the
cautious granting of for-cause challenges, State's Brief at 81, is misplaced.26
The presumption of prejudice sought by Calliham is not the wholesale
automatic reversal rule discussed in the State's Brief at 79 and 80. Rather, he
seeks a presumption of prejudice only in cases wherein the trial court's rulings
effectively grant the prosecution substantially more peremptory challenges than the
defense, and thus give the prosecution an unfair advantage in shaping the jury. See
Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329, 1333-1334 (Utah 1993)(applying this presumption
in civil context); Carrier v. ProTech. 944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997).
The State does not contest the Court's observation in these cases that when
26

The State seeks to mollify the fact that the trial court gave the prosecutor the option
of keeping Reilly on the panel by citing to State v. Litherianri. 2000 UT 76, §§ 21, 23,
31, 12 P.3d 92, for this proposition: "If a party chooses to retain a prospective
jurorfor whom [it] arguably possessed a suffident basis to challenge for cause,' the
trial court does not act unreasonably in respecting that parties' decision." State's
Brief at 77.
Litheriand involves a claim of ineffective assistance of defense counsel at trial
for failing to challenge jurors for cause, and discusses the Strickland presumptions
in that unique context that defense counsel abstained from challenging the jurors as
a matter of choice, and that this choice constituted effective representation. See id.
Litheriand does not stand for the proposition that a trial court may cede its authority
to rule on challenges for cause or to remove jurors for cause to the prosecution.
25

one side has substantially more peremptory challenges than the other, this gives the
side with more peremptory challenges an upper hand in shaping the jury.
Nor does the State contest the fundamental constitutional law guarantying that
defendants be treated with fairness, impartiality and uniformity.27
The State's argument that the number of peremptories was equal for the
prosecution and defense in this case overlooks the fact that the trial court recognized
at the outset that the Callihams should have more peremptory challenges than the
prosecution, by originally granting the two defendants five peremptory challenges to
exercise jointly and one challenge each to exercise independently, and gave the
prosecutor five challenges (R. 400 at 265).
This original ruling was consistent with subsection (d) of rule 18, which grants
trial courts discretion to grant jointly tried criminal defendants additional peremptory
challenges, and consistent with the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, given
the disparate defenses and positions of the Callihams.28 Effectively granting the

27

Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution, and § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution both guarantee due process of law. These provisions require trial
courts to act fairly and impartially in civil and criminal cases. See Anderson v. Industrial
Commission of Utah. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985)("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process.") (citation omitted); State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, 992
P.2d 951, 961 (impartial judge is essential to a fair trial).
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees equal protection of the laws, and Article I § 24 of the Utah Constitution requires
uniform operation of the laws.
23

Terril raised an alibi defense, while Jordan relied on reasonable doubt Terril
had to match his alibi evidence against conflicting evidence by the state, while

26

prosecution the same number of peremptory challenges as these two defendants
were required to share was inconsistent with recognized principles of equal
protection and uniform operation of the laws. C_f. Carrier v. Pro Tech. 944 P.2d 346,
354 (Utah 1997); Randle at 1333-34.
Given the unique and life altering difference one juror can make in a criminal
case, the rationale behind presumption of prejudice recognized in the civil arena
applies with much greater force in the criminal context, and the presumption should
as well. See Randle and Carrier, supra.
C. ACTUAL PREJUDICE UNDER SEYBOLD
In the event that prejudice is not presumed, it is established under Seyboldt.
because Reilly and Steele were so acutely aware of their responsibilities as jurors.
See Opening Brief of Appellant, Point IV, subpoints A and B. CJ. Seybold. 236 P.
225, 228-30 (finding trial court's erroneous sua sponte for-cause removal of a juror
harmless, because cursory voir dire of juror did not display anything particularly
valuable about that juror).
In light of the foregoing, the trial court's removal of Reilly and Steele without
cause were prejudicial errors requiring a new trial.

Jordan had to contend with his alleged admissions to jaiihouse informants.
Opening Brief of Appellant, Statement of Facts.
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See

CONCLUSION
Individually, and cumulatively, the errors discussed above warrant a new
trial.
DATED this 20th day of August, 2001.
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